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Dear list members,
Our
next seminar will be held on Friday 21st at 6.00
pm. This month the seminar will be hosted at University of Western Sydney,
Superintendents Cottage. Please refer to Map (Ref ET) for details. Our speaker
will be John Wu
We do hope you can attend
AABS Executive
Truth, Experience and Enlightenment in
Longchenpa
The most prominent feature of the Dzogchen
tradition in Tibet, which has no readily identifiable source in
Indian Buddhism, is its belief in the existence of a primordial
mind that is already enlightened from a timeless beginning. It
is not the ordinary mind of discursive thoughts that waver
between the two psychological poles of attraction and revulsion
that characterise the unenlightened life of ordinary people. The
first Tibetan thinker to develop Dzogchen into a philosophical
system was Longchenpa, also known as Longchen Rabjam
(1308-1363). In Longchenpa's thought, primordial mind is
postulated as the "basic space of being" itself. From the
Western perspective, this beckons at the possibility of
formulating a phenomenology of enlightenment which sees the
essence of being as not problematic, but already perfected in
the beginning. Intrinsic evil, for example, is not a possibility
in Dzogchen. The criteria for arriving at this insight can only
have a hermeneutic basis in the Tibetan Buddhist distinction
between myong-ba and nyams, which both mean experience but with
the latter emphasising "subjectivity", and in the Tibetan
practice of transforming nyams into rtogs, which is the non-dual
realisation of enlightenment (see Janet Gyatso, 1999). In
Dzogchen, nyams is possible in the first place because of the
ceaseless manifestations of the primordial mind itself. Yet the
assertion of this "truth" is only possible if the error of a
misunderstood nyams is a real ane ever present possibility. To
echo Heidegger, it can be said that primordial enlightenment
actually takes part in the contested interplay between truth as
disclosure and falsehood as concealment, such that the question
of truth in experience comes to the fore. This philosophical
problem will be examined in light of Longchenpa's insights into
the indeterminacy of experience in the Tibetan understanding of
religious truth.
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