



Madhyamaka Constructionism: Establishing the Unreal

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Given the Buddha's claim of Anātman is it possible to posit persons, existing as relative phenomena within the framework of a kind of interdependent dynamic system? I do just this by arguing that what is being rejected by the doctrine of anātman is not the existence of persons, but rather the existence of (1) a non-fabricated objective agent of experience, (2) any notion of an variant or invariant property of any kind, at any level of discourse which *is* the self or is acting *as* a self, and (3) intrinsic identity at any level. I will suggest that from within the framework of conventional discourse, persons are merely epiphenomenal and this scheme leaves intact functional first-person experience that resolves the tension between the seemingly contradictory thesis of no-self and the givenness of first person experience.